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Patents and Cumulative Innovation
Clarisa Long*
Proprietary rights to the products of biomedical research have
repeatedly been a source of controversy for over twenty years.
Patents on biomedical innovations1 have allowed scientists,
academics, and research institutions to raise research funds and have
contributed to the growth of the biotechnology industry.2 But “one
firm’s research tool may be another firm’s end product.”3 Patents
have been a source of great concern for academic and basic
researchers, who fear that proprietary rights to basic research results
will hamper the progress of science, stifle the free flow of new
knowledge and the dissemination of research results, and chill the
research efforts of scientists who fear infringement liability.4 The
tension between a patentholder’s interest of maximizing the revenue
stream from a patented invention and the public and private interests
of allowing downstream research to be conducted on the patented
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. I would like to
thank the organizers of, and participants in, the conference at which I presented this paper.
1. Economist Joseph A. Schumpeter argued that a fundamental difference existed
between invention and innovation: invention alone “produce[s] no economic effect, while
patent-based innovation has a positive impact on the economic system as new industries and
new goods displace the old.” Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512,
1529 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Newman, J., concurring) (citing JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950)).
2. See LYNN G. ZUCKER ET AL., INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL AND THE BIRTH OF THE U.S.
BIOTECHNOLOGY ENTERPRISES 15 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No.
4653, 1994) (“the existence of the venture capital industry in America has had a significant
effect on the development of the biotech industry”). One commentator has even said that
“[b]iotechnology has emerged as an industry largely because of one economic institution:
venture capital.” MARTIN KENNEY, BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
133 (1986).
3. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, A Technology Policy Perspective On The NIH Gene Patenting
Controversy, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 633, 647 n.51 (1994).
4. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Reply to Comments on the
Patentability of Certain Inventions Associated with the Identification of Partial cDNA
Sequences, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 61 (1995); see, e.g., American College of Medical Genetics,
Position Statement on Gene Patents and Accessibility of Gene Testing (visited Feb. 12, 2000)
<http://www.faseb.org/genetics/acmg/pol-34.htm>.
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product is particularly acute when the invention has both basic and
applied uses.
I suggest that the patent system should seek to balance incentives
at all stages of the research process. Discussion of the proper role of
proprietary rights in general, and patents in particular, has long been
dominated by models that apply a linear approach to the process of
scientific discovery and innovation.5 Such models implicitly assume
that a patented product is the final consumer end product. In fact,
scientific research is not linear; reality is much more complicated.
Today biomedical research proceeds not by placing one brick upon
the other within a single discipline, but by solving complex
multidisciplinary problems. This process is leading to new models of
innovation and research, which in turn influence how researchers,
whether in the public or private sector, use patent rights.
In part I of this Article, I explore the traditional conception of
proprietary rights regimes as an attempt to balance information
creation and dissemination. In part II, I highlight a number of
fundamental shifts in the evolution of markets for biomedical
information and products. In part III, I suggest that these factors
affect the appropriate role for proprietary rights and conclude that we
need to construct dynamic, rather than static, models of proprietary
rights.
I.
The entire edifice of intellectual property rights is built around a
simple dilemma: without proprietary rights, insufficient innovation
will occur, but with proprietary rights, innovations will be
inadequately distributed. One horn of the dilemma arises because
information is expensive to create, but cheap to copy. Making an
invention public reveals the information it contains to competitors,
who can then copy the information and appropriate the value of the
property at a price lower than the costs incurred by the original
producers. If inventors cannot receive protection for their creations,
5. See, e.g., Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Inventions, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609-24 (Richard Nelson ed.,
1962).
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the price that inventors will be able to charge for access to them will
diminish, their revenues will drop, and, consequently, their incentives
to invent will diminish.6 Therefore, private actors will underproduce
innovations because they cannot appropriate the full value of the
innovation in the absence of proprietary rights.7
This aspect of the dilemma is exacerbated when the value of the
invention stems predominantly from the information it contains,
rather than from its physical structure. Innovators face the same costs
of producing a unit of information regardless of the number of people
who will use it, but once revealed, the information can be used
endlessly. As a result, information is the classic example of a public
good. True public goods are characterized by two conditions: 1) they
are nonrivalrous, which means that one person’s use does not
diminish the amount of the good available for use by others, and 2)
they are nonexcludable, which means that users cannot exclude
others.8 The public goods aspects of scientific research create the
problem of nonappropriability: when innovators do not expect to
recover the costs of invention because they cannot appropriate the
full value of the resulting information, then society should expect a
lower, suboptimal level of innovation.9 Thus, it becomes necessary to
supply incentives for innovators to create scientific information
through research.
If the market will underproduce information because innovators
will have inadequate incentives to invent and make their inventions
public, then the state can attempt to overcome market failure with
several strategies.10 First, it can produce the information itself. In the
field of biomedical research, the U.S. government has done just that
6. See, e.g., Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., An Economic Review of the Patent System, Study No. 15
(1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup); Arrow, supra note 5, at 615; WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS,
INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE 70-90 (1969); F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 379-99 (1970); Richard R. Nelson, The Economics
of Invention: A Survey of the Literature, 32 J. BUS. 101 (1959).
7. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 126 (3d ed. 2000).
8. Id.
9. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 247 (1994).
10. Paul David, Knowledge, Property, and the System Dynamics of Technological
Change, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMICS 215, 225-28 (1992).
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in the form of the National Human Genome Research Institute
(NHGRI), and more generally, the National Institutes of Health
(NIH). Second, the state can subsidize the private production of the
information it believes is socially optimal. The Orphan Drug Act and
direct funding of biomedical research are examples.11 Direct
intervention, whether through active or passive state funding and
participation, has been the institutional vehicle for stimulating
production of information (such as basic research) when the social
returns of such information are higher than the costs. As a result,
universities and the government have traditionally performed much
of the basic research while private entities have done much of the
development. Third, the state can create enforcement measures that
allow innovators to appropriate the value of the information. The
patent system is an example of this approach.
The second horn of the dilemma arises because when inventors
can get proprietary rights to their innovations, the number of people
who can use the innovation will diminish, even if it could be
disseminated to additional people at no cost. Under some
circumstances it may be more beneficial to have fewer innovations,
but have them distributed broadly, than to have many innovations
that are accessible to a few people.12 The difficulty of assuring the
socially optimal diffusion or distribution of scientific information
manifests itself most acutely in determining the optimum scope of
protection that creators of basic research or pre-commercial
inventions should receive, while assuring that downstream innovators
have access to basic research results in order to build on them.13
Although important, this problem is often overshadowed in the
literature by the problem of producing enough scientific knowledge.14
11. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 360aa-360ee (1994); 26 U.S.C. § 45C (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 236 (1994)).
12. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989).
13. Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research & the
Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 31, 34 (1991).
14. See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 5.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/8
p229 Long.doc 08/25/00
2000] Patents and Cumulative Innovation 233
II.
A number of broad trends occurring in biomedical research affects
how the information creation/dissemination tradeoff plays out. The
process of discovery, invention, and information diffusion is
undergoing a paradigmatic shift as biomedical research has become
increasingly information-based, as basic research and product
development increasingly depend on continuous and nonlinear
interactions with each other, and as scientific practices and industry
business models are evolving to blur the traditional boundaries
between public and private goods.
The amount of biomedical information available to researchers is
estimated to have increased logarithmically every five years, which
means that today scientists have approximately one-thousand times
the quantity of information available to them that they did in 1985.15
An entire industry has sprung up surrounding the creation of genomic
information.16 The creation of massive quantities of raw data and
information about genes and protein sequences, on an almost daily
basis, has created information bottlenecks in the lab and in the
market.17 No single lab or firm can absorb even a small part of this
expanding information. Having compiled masses of genomic
information, scientists now find themselves asking the next question:
exactly what do the products of these genes do? The answer, at least
as far as investors are concerned, is that it may not matter: genomic
information has become a key strategic and competitive asset
independent of applied products.18 This explosion of genomics data
and the proliferation of new information-based research approaches
call into question many long-held beliefs and assumptions about the
role of intellectual property rights as incentives for research
discovery, incentives for technology innovation, and incentives for
15. Jon Cohen, The Genomics Gamble, 275 SCI. 767, 768 (Feb. 7, 1997).
16. The genome is the full complement of DNA that an organism or cell possesses. See
BENJAMIN LEWIN, GENES 657 (1994); The National Human Genome Research Institute,
Glossary of Genetic Terms (visited Feb. 14, 2000) <http://www.nhgri.nih.gov/DIR/VIP/
Glossary>. Genomics is the field of scientific research pertaining to the study of genomes.
17. See Cohen, supra note 15, at 767.
18. Justin Gillis, California Firm Joins Race to Map Genes, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1998,
at C1; LEHMAN BROTHERS, GENOMICS (1996).
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the diffusion of both.
As Walter Gilbert first predicted in 1991, burgeoning genetic
knowledge was destined to change the paradigm of biomedical
research— and he easily could have included the accepted paths for
pharmaceutical industry innovation.19 Traditionally, rapid imitation
of new products in the pharmaceutical industry was difficult because
patents provided solid protection, for the most part, against
imitation.20 Because pharmaceutical products are very specific, small
variations in molecular structure can have disproportionate effects on
the drug’s pharmacological properties. With a few exceptions, this
made it difficult for a competitor to invent around a patent on a
molecular compound or class of compounds by making small
changes to the drug’s structure. Thus, although pharmaceutical
innovation was a capital-intensive, high-risk process, relatively
strong patent protection on the product that finally emerged at the end
of the research pipeline allowed firms to recoup their investment.21
Biomedical research, particularly that pertaining to genomics,
departs from this model. Most significantly, genomic information and
research tools based on information technologies— not only the
products derived from their use— have themselves become
marketable. The core business of an increasing number of new
market entrants is information about the genetic codes of various
organisms, not the sale of drugs or diagnostics. For example, Celera,
a private sector firm, announced that it derives its revenues primarily
from subscription fees from database customers, rather than from
licensing intellectual property rights or selling products.22
Biomedical research requires ongoing access to the state of the
art.23 Drug discovery, diagnostic discovery, and innovation have
19. Walter Gilbert, Toward a Paradigm Shift in Biology, 349 NATURE 99 (1991).
20. Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns From Industrial Research and
Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMICS ACTIVITY 783-831 (1987).
21. See Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the
Pharmaceutical Industry: Implications for Innovation, Consumer Welfare, and Health Policy,
10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 185, 213-15 (1999).
22. Celera, Celera Up Close (visited Feb. 15, 2000) <http://www.celera.com>.
23. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION
AND DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE NEW SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION: THE ROLE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1996); Eliot Marshall, Is Data Hoarding Slowing the
Assault on Pathogens?, 275 SCI. 777 (1997) (one scientist opines that “new DNA data should
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become progressively more dependent on access to a common pool
of accumulated scientific knowledge. Continued product discoveries
and innovations also rely increasingly on the knowledge gleaned
from preceding ones and on generally available techniques that have
made the process of innovation more predictable. The process of
innovation and invention for new drugs and diagnostics is beginning
to reflect the thrust of entirely new conceptual approaches, a broad
range of new market entrants in new niche markets, product life-
cycles that are shortening dramatically, and the growing importance
of basic research and its results to the trajectory of new product
innovation.
New investment in basic biomedical research is frequently
oriented “to securing ownership of research and developing it toward
markets.”24 New entrants in the upstream market for genomic
information are less capital intensive, exhibit much faster time to
market, and offer different risk-reward models for investors than the
traditional pharmaceutical companies. The marked trend to strategic
alliances reflects the importance of preemptively acquiring ownership
of research. Genomic database networks have stimulated the
formation of strategic alliances among pharmaceutical, biotech,
genomic, and information technology companies in an attempt to
gain control of a package of genomic information and data to sell or
license to users.25
Even if the information generated by new market entrants is not
always patentable, the question of who owns it is becoming more
porous. New biomedical research approaches and the increasing
value of genomic information are creating a new “food chain” or
“discovery pipeline” that undermines the traditional market structure
in which nonprofit institutions, first generation biotechnology firms,
and integrated drug companies play clearly defined roles shepherding
research from the basic to the applied end of the discovery pipeline.26
be released immediately, even daily”).
24. John Hodgson, Biotechnology in a Year of Living Prosperously, 15 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 227-30 (1997).
25. See, e.g., LEHMAN BROTHERS, supra note 18, at 15-16; HERMAN SAFTLAS,
STANDARD & POOR’S INDUSTRY SURVEYS: BIOTECHNOLOGY 17 (1999).
26. As one blunt genomics information CEO concluded: “The more genomics companies
we link ourselves with, the more we migrate up the food chain and the less and less we’ll be
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Instead, both ends of the spectrum are coming together as
pharmaceutical producers enter into strategic alliances with, or
acquire outright, small firms specializing in the production of genetic
information.27 New risk-sharing collaborative arrangements such as
strategic alliances consortia, and mergers and acquisitions also
introduce significant changes in the status quo.
The enhanced role of ideas and discoveries in value and wealth
creation means larger firms must become research portfolio
managers, both internally and externally. Once a research finding or
technology appears promising, there are incentives to acquire rights
to it. Once it shows sufficient value in enabling product development,
integrated firms often buy the owner. For the bulk of research,
however, there is a growing need to broker uncertainty and risk,
including the ownership of rights, which creates an environment in
which strategic alliances and brokerage functions dominate.
The link between scientific breakthroughs and marketable
innovations continues to shorten and tighten. The compression of the
time involved in this research and innovation makes the linkage even
stronger as new complementary relationships must be forged to meet
the competitive pressures of basic biomedical research in universities
and in the marketplace. The initial evidence suggests that, as occurred
in the electronics industry when product life-cycles shortened
dramatically, innovation rewards increasingly will come from so-
called “first mover” advantages in being the first to market rather
than from patent rights alone.28 For example, Celera has announced
that its competitive strategy is to “promote use of [its] information by
a wide variety of users . . . to ensure access to valuable sequencing
data by the entire biomedical and agricultural research community.”29
The sheer quantities of information created by the Human
Genome Project and other genomics research ventures have focused
attention away from defining information possession, the raison
d’être of the intellectual property system, to optimizing information
butting heads with academics.” Cohen, supra note 15, at 772.
27. See, e.g., Glenn A. Friedrich, Moving Beyond the Genome Projects, 14 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1234 (1996).
28. Patently Outdated, ECONOMIST, July 18, 1987, at 18; Testing, Testing, ECONOMIST,
Feb. 1, 1997, at 82.
29. Celera, supra note 22.
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management— an area in which the intellectual property system is
decidedly deficient. While the scientific community is faced with the
fundamental questions of how to cope with this information
explosion, and how to apply it to key areas, the intellectual property
system is challenged by the fact that it simply was not designed to
handle the realities of information production and management that
are occurring in the field of genetic research today. This is creating a
number of cross-currents that are forcing a reexamination of the
scope and nature of rights needed to maintain discovery and
innovation.
III.
The characteristics of basic biomedical research and of markets
for biomedical information suggest that the dissemination/creation
tradeoff I discussed in part I may be particularly acute when applied
to the products of biomedical research. As I argued in part II,
biomedical research is cumulative and characterized by information-
intensive inputs. Current models of intellectual property protection
fail to account for the nuances of a research and development process
in which patents can be granted at multiple stages. The information-
intensive qualities of scientific innovations, combined with the
cumulative nature of scientific research, suggest that current models
of proprietary rights protection are insufficient. Neither a model that
grants broad rights to all initial inventors nor a model that reserves
excessive protection for subsequent innovators should be applied
across the entire range of basic research results. The full implications
of this problem cannot possibly be discussed here, but I would like to
highlight a few issues that need further research.
One concern is that biomedical research is an area in which
overbroad patents to initial innovators will enervate the incentives for
downstream research. One commentator has argued that “[e]xcessive
protection for first generation innovation can impede later stages,
thereby undermining some of the salutary effects of strong
intellectual property protection.”30 Under some circumstances, strong
30. Peter Menell, The Challenges of Reforming Intellectual Property Protection for
Computer Software, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2644, 2646 (1994).
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protection for certain discoveries too early in their evolution will
retard further development or redirect research in less beneficial
directions. For example, the semiconductor industry in its formative
years was marked by rapid, multidirectional progress in both the
underlying basic research and the cumulative technology that grew
out of it.31 This highly beneficial burst of scientific, technological,
and economic advancement had broad social consequences, only
partially glimpsed at the time, that would not have been possible in a
legal regime that strongly protected intellectual property rights in
many of the early innovations.32
Other industries, however, rely heavily on strong patent
protection. One study shows that eighty percent of firms surveyed in
the chemical, transportation equipment, electrical equipment, food,
metals, and machinery industries indicated that the strength of
intellectual property protection had a “major effect” in their
willingness to invest in research and development facilities abroad.33
There are significant differences, however, between sectors in
research and development, investment, and innovative performance.34
The impact of patent protection on market behavior depends on the
character of technology in a field, the nature of the industry involved,
and the way in which research is conducted.35 It is unclear whether
conclusions gleaned from industries characterized by tangible
commercial products can be extrapolated to biomedical research
generally. It is certain that such conclusions cannot be extended to
patents on biomedical research results that are so far upstream that no
commercial product currently exists.
Strong protection for upstream innovation can significantly affect
the incentive to conduct follow-on research, but commentators
disagree on precisely how. While one model of intellectual property
31. Richard C. Levin, The Semiconductor Industry, in GOVERNMENT AND TECHNICAL
PROGRESS: A CROSS-INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 9-100 (Richard Nelson ed., 1982).
32. Id.
33. Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and
Technology Transfer, International Finance Corporation, Discussion Paper Number 19 (The
World Bank: Washington, D.C., 1994), p. 1.
34. Levin et al., supra note 20.
35. Renato Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories About the Benefits and
Costs of Patents, IIEE PAPERS 20 (June 20, 1996).
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protection argues that early allocation of patent rights can make
downstream research allocations more efficient,36 other models
suggest that upstream protection steers research away from
incremental improvements over existing inventions.37 When
innovation in a field of scientific endeavor, such as biomedical
research, is cumulative and characterized by information-intensive
inputs, I do not presume that granting a broad scope of protection
induces efficient downstream innovation. Instead, I regard this as an
unsettled issue in need of more research. If biomedical research is an
area in which proprietary rights at early stages of innovation
determine the outcomes of later stages, it would be helpful to know
what factors cause proprietary rights at early stages to hinder or help
downstream research.
Analysis is complicated by the fact that patentability standards
have proven to be very dynamic over the past twenty years. Over
time, patentable subject matter has crept ever closer to the basic end
of the biomedical research spectrum. Today, the scope of protection
for biomedical inventions can be very broad and may cover very
basic research.38 For example, patents have issued on such inventions
as any “non-human mammal” all of the cells of which contain an
introduced cancer-inducing DNA sequence,39 stem cells,40 and partial
gene fragments so small that they comprised, on average, less than
0.000005% of the human genome.41 Each of these inventions has
36. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature & Functions of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265 (1977).
37. See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 5; Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839-916 (1990).
38. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines basic
research as “experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge
of the underlying foundation of phenomena and observable facts.” OECD DIRECTORATE FOR
SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, THE MEASUREMENT OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES:
PROPOSED STANDARD PRACTICE FOR SURVEYS OF RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTAL
DEVELOPMENT: FRASCATI MANUAL 1993 29 (1994).
39. Leder & Stewart, Transgenic Non-Human Mammals, U.S. PATENT NO. 4,736,866,
Apr. 12, 1988.
40. Tsukamoto et al., Human Hematopoietic Stem Cell, U.S. PATENT No. 5,061,620, Oct.
29, 1991.
41. Au-Young et al., Human Kinase Homologs, U.S. PATENT NO. 5,817,479, Oct. 6,
1998. For additional examples of broad patents on biotechnological inventions, see John H.
Barton, Patent Scope in Biotechnology, 26 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 605
(1995).
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been, or is anticipated to be, the source from which further research
and discoveries will spring.
At the same time, the nature of biomedical research has changed:
no longer can research results be divided neatly into “pure” basic
research, which seeks to expand general understanding of the laws of
a scientific field, and “pure” applied research, which is directed
toward some commercial or practical use.42 One of the most profound
changes in biomedical research to occur in the last two decades has
been the “commercialization” of what was traditionally considered to
be basic science research.43 One commentator has argued that
scientific inquiry is “being transformed by financial
considerations.”44 Cutting-edge biomedical research requires ever-
increasing amounts of money that cannot be met from traditional
government or nonprofit sources. Throughout most of the Cold War,
government heavily subsidized the collection and distribution of
basic scientific data. For both budgetary and ideological reasons, the
government’s role as an information provider and clearinghouse is
being scaled back and this function is being privatized.45
Scientific fields characterized by researchers possessing the same
knowledge base and perceiving the same opportunities experience
more races to patent and to publish. Strong intellectual property
rights for early stage innovation can result in redundant or duplicative
research in the race to capture proprietary rights.46 The ongoing race
to patent gene fragments, for example, illustrates how multiple
independent discoveries can result in long patent application backlogs
and knotty questions about who owns what, and on what terms.47 At
42. See DONALD E. STOKES, PASTEUR’S QUADRANT: BASIC SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 7 (1997) (describing the blurring of categorization of basic and
applied research).
43. Tiffany Ayers ed., Science and Technology Leaders Discuss Innovations for the
Future, 286 SCI. 1753 (1999).
44. Id.
45. Eric A. Benhamou, R&D Needs Washington’s Support, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1999, at
A26 (“From 1987 to 1995, federal investment in basic research shrank by 2.6% a year. As a
fraction of gross domestic product, the federal investment in research and development is about
half of what it was 30 years ago.”).
46. Partha S. Dasgupta & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Uncertainty: Industrial Structure and the
Speed of R&D, 11 BELL J. ECON. 1 (1980); Glenn C. Loury, Market Structure and Innovation,
93 Q. J. ECON. 395-410 (1979).
47. Eliot Marshall, Companies Rush to Patent DNA, 275 SCI. 781 (1997).
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the same time, however, patent races can achieve desirable side
effects when they accelerate the rate of innovation. Competition
between the public and private sectors to sequence the human
genome resulted in several years being shaved off the estimated
completion time of the project. 48
Tension exists between publishing research results and patenting
them.49 In the scientific arena, publication and discussion of research
results is the coin of the realm.50 Research results must be verified by
repeatable experiments and cross-checked by one’s peers. Several
rounds of publication and feedback are considered necessary before a
discovery is considered to be adequately developed. Because a single
round of publication and peer review often takes more than one year,
scientists are left with the choice of either publishing or patenting, but
not both. Under the patent laws, a patent cannot be granted on an
invention that has been in the public domain for more than one year.51
Scientists who share their research results also run the second-order
danger of precluding themselves from getting patent rights to
inventions down the road if the publications are later deemed to
render their inventions obvious.52
Strong intellectual property protection may deter research and
investment if researchers determine the field to be so crowded that
the costs of research outweigh the benefits.53 Protection for scientific
information may stimulate innovation, but at a high social cost when
it delays access to, and dissemination of, new ideas. Enclosure of raw
scientific data and basic research results could result in less timely
communication among researchers in a field in which the time value
of information is high. By the same token, it remains a serious
48. Ralph T. King, Jr., Code Green: Gene Quest Will Bring Glory to Some, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 10, 2000, at A1.
49. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 YALE L. J. 177-231 (1987).
50. See id.; KENNEY, supra note 2, at 108; ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF
SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 267-78 (1973).
51. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless— the
invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in
public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for
in the United States”).
52. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
53. Dasgupta & Stiglitz, supra note 46, at 19-20.
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question whether the incentives created by proprietary rights are
necessary for discoveries or innovations that would appear in the
public domain even in the absence of proprietary rights.
As digital technologies continue to lower the costs of reproducing
information, the cost of copying information drops relative to the
costs of creating the information. Faced with the possibility of not
being able to recoup its investment costs, an entity producing basic
research information faces the incentive either to withhold
information, to wait until the innovation reaches a more
commercial— as opposed to basic— stage, or not to innovate. Thus,
tension exists between trying to reconcile competing incentives: those
needed to obtain the creation and early release of valuable first-
generation inventions with those that will encourage second- and
third-generation follow-on innovations. Some commentators believe
that the incentives between multiple stages of innovation cannot be
reconciled to eliminate this tension.54
Discussion about the social costs and benefits of the patent system
often assumes that the maximizing invention is the only purpose
served by the patent system. Many scholars, especially economists,
have proposed models based on the tacit assumption that inventors
work in noncompeting areas and do not produce duplicative or
redundant inventions.55 According to these models, when inventions
are not redundant, stronger patent protection results in a greater
number of inventions, and thus creates a net increase in overall social
utility. But what happens when this assumption becomes
inapplicable?
The assumption that inventors are not working in competing areas
does not apply to biomedical research. In many respects government
institutions and universities have become new entrants in innovation
markets by design and by financial necessity.56 Beginning with the
54. Scotchmer, supra note 13, at 31, 34.
55. See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 5, at 619-22; WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION,
GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1962);
F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus’s Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62
AM. ECON. REV. 422 (1972).
56. Jerome Schultz, National Science Foundation’s Perspective on University-Industry
Interaction, in BIOTECHNOLOGY: SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND ETHICAL CHALLENGES FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 131-46 (Frederick B. Rudolph & Larry V. McIntire eds., 1996).
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Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, federal policy has permitted and encouraged
universities to obtain intellectual property rights on government-
funded research as a means to stimulate technology transfers.57
Although many scholars consider the policy wisdom of this approach
to be controversial,58 a recent report calculated that this legislation
has created $11 billion in product sales and 75,000 new jobs.59 New
university patents have grown from about 280 a year before 1980 to
more than 2,600 a year.60
The motives of universities are not monolithic in the biomedical
research arena. In part, some are taking an entrepreneurial approach
towards the products of their research; they want to shore up sagging
balance sheets and overcome the loss of federal funding.61 Other
institutions see intellectual property rights as the best means to
transform their technology into products that benefit everyone.62 One
study of academic basic research identified “intellectual property” as
the third major function of the university.63 Regardless of motive,
universities have opportunistically created a growing array of
cooperative undertakings with industry and their own faculty.64
Interaction is not just inter-sectoral, in which industrial players
compete and cooperate with academic ones. In addition, individual
research teams, often within the same sector and even the same firm
or institution, compete to be either the first to publish the data or the
first to the patent office with an application on the results of their
basic research. An example of this can be found in the ongoing race
57. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-11 (1994).
58. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Technology Transfer and the Genome Project:
Problems with Patenting Research Tools, 5 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV’T 168 (1994).
59. Schultz, supra note 56, at 134.
60. Id.
61. See Benhamou, supra note 45, at A26 (describing the drop in federal funding for basic
research).
62. John T. Preston, The Research University, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 208-13 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds.,
1994).
63. Daryl E. Chubin, How Large an R&D Enterprise, in THE FRAGILE CONTRACT:
UNIVERSITY SCIENCE AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 125 (David H. Guston & Kenneth
Keniston eds., 1994).
64. University researchers have formed alliances with industry for research funds, as well
as serving in a for-profit capacity as consultants, equity holders, and directors. See David
Blumenthal, University-Industry Research Relationships in Biotechnology: Implications for the
University, 232 SCI. 1361, 1364 (1986).
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between entities, such as Human Genome Science and Incyte, that are
attempting to patent DNA fragments known as expressed sequence
tags or ESTs, and entities, such as the National Institutes of Health,
Merck, and Celera, that are attempting to get the same basic research
information into the public domain. The result contains both costs
and benefits: research is spurred by the race, but the research is
duplicative as one set of players tries to obtain proprietary rights to
what another set of entities is trying to give away.
Where proprietary rights start out often determines where they end
up. Valuation problems arise when patentees attempt to determine the
value of a license on a patent covering an innovation that has no
current commercial uses. Although the ultimate private values of
basic research results are frequently uncertain in advance, one way to
attempt to maximize the public value is to make basic research results
widely available to all researchers who might need them.65
Enclosure of research results from being a public good to being
subject to proprietary rights affects innovators differently. This is
because information is not only an output of basic research, but also a
critical input.66 It remains an open question as to whether broad
claims on basic biomedical research will, on balance, create net
incentives or disincentives for investment in biotechnology
research.67 Take, for example, the patent issued by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office to Incyte on October 6, 1998, which
some consider the first patent issued on a type of gene fragment
known as an expressed sequence tag or EST.68 Such patents will
become increasingly important as we gain increased understanding of
the mechanisms of the genome.69
Rebecca Eisenberg and Michael Heller have argued that, in the
context of biomedical research, too many patent rights on basic
research discoveries may stifle downstream research and product
65. See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 1065.
66. Arrow, supra note 5, at 618.
67. See, e.g., Dorothy R. Auth, Are ESTs Patentable?, 15 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 911,
911 (1997) (expressing concern that broad claims to ESTs would create disincentives to invest
in biotechnology).
68. Au-Young, supra note 41.
69. King, Jr., supra note 48, at A1.
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development by greatly increasing transaction costs.70 Whether
allowing patents on basic research tools results is a net advance or
deterrence of innovation is a complex empirical question that remains
unanswered. If Heller and Eisenberg are right about transaction
costs,71 then the current model of allowing patenting “close to the lab
bench” ironically creates one market failure (excessive transaction
costs) in the attempt to overcome another (the problem of public
goods).72
Ultimately, the argument boils down to whether, in the long run,
strong patents encourage or discourage investing.73 As the costs of
doing basic research continue to rise and innovation cycles shorten, it
remains essential to assure innovators that adequate incentives exist
to develop follow-on innovations. It is unclear which factors, or mix
of factors, determine the optimal level of protection at each stage of
the research process. The number of second, third, and fourth
generation innovations that can spring from an initial invention
appears to be one such factor. Increasing appropriability by allowing
patenting close to the research bench when no commercial product is
in sight, however, does not necessarily lead to more innovation.74
Fostering more socially beneficial innovation does not rest solely
with solving the public goods problem by tinkering with the
incentives to ensure additional appropriability.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, there is at present no analytical answer to the question of
how to distribute the incentives between basic researchers and
downstream innovators so as to optimize innovation at all stages of
the research and development process. In all likelihood, the answer
70. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998).
71. Id.
72. Cooter and Ulen define four different kinds of market failure: monopoly and market
power, externalities, public goods, and severe informational asymmetries. COOTER & ULEN,
supra note 7, at 38-41. See also id. at 84-89 (describing transaction costs and their impact on
legal rules).
73. Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 35.
74. Levin, supra note 20, at 816 (“Stronger appropriability will not yield more innovation
in all contexts and, where it does, innovation may come at excessive cost.”).
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will vary from industry to industry, from scientific field to scientific
field, and from one innovation to the next. At the end of the day, one
thing is clear: The path of scientific research and technological
innovation is complex, nonlinear, variable, and uncertain. Economic
and legal models that do not account for follow-on innovations
overlook the multidimensional complexity of the inventive process.
We need to revamp our models of proprietary rights to reflect the
research environment accurately and to create the optimum incentives
for scientific innovation.
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